propose a securitisation solution for the bank-sovereign doom-loop. This shields senior tranche investors from actual defaults but whether it stabilises flight-to-safety panics is unclear. We apply dynamic VaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall methods to assess whether real-time risks to investors are attenuated by holding sovereign bond-backed securities. Price dynamics are derived using a Monte Carlo method. We find that holders of the senior tranche would be as safe as holders of German bunds. Mezzanine risk exposure would be moderate. The junior tranche experiences less severe shocks than high-risk sovereigns. The proposal significantly reduces destabilising market dynamics. JEL classification: E43, E44, E52, E53, G12, G14.
Non-Technical Summary
proposed a sovereign bond-backed securitisation solution to the problem of euro area banks' concentrated exposures to their own country's sovereign bonds. This paper forms part of the research-based evidence of the ESRB Task Force on Safe Assets that was set up to assess the proposal. The securitisation creates a tiered structure of subordination such that, holders of the most junior claims are hit with the first default losses. This forms a buffer that protects holders of the more senior tranches of the securitisation.
It is claimed that such a securitisation would automatically spread the exposure of banks across the underlying sovereigns and improve the quality of their financial assets. Banks have tended to concentrate their holdings in the bonds of their home sovereign and, during the crisis, sovereigns chose to recapitalise their failing banks. Sovereign risk and bank solvency became intertwined in a damaging doom-loop. If banks mainly hold the senior tranche of a sovereign bond-backed securitisation they should be substantially protected from default losses of their own, and other, sovereigns. In addition, a successful sovereign bond-backed securitisation could substantially increase the supply of safe assets and reduce negative spillovers of volatility between sovereign markets.
Although there has been a lot of work confirming how sovereign securitisation would reduce exposure to simulated defaults, there is limited consideration of how variation in expectations of default interacts with bond markets in real-time. These interactions are important because fear itself (as well as ambiguity about policy responses) can drive markets and this can push yields to levels that make debt roll-over too expensive to be sustainable.
So even if default is not warranted based on fundamentals, a sovereign may still lose market access and may have to default due to illiquidity rather than insolvency.
To assess real time market risks and their interactions we apply dynamic VaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall methods. Price dynamics are derived using the Monte Carlo method of Schönbucher (2003) . We find that senior tranche investors would be as safe as holders of German bunds and both can be regarded as safe havens. Mezzanine risk exposure would be moderate. Investors in the junior tranche experience much less severe shocks than investors holding high-risk sovereigns. This is mainly due to a diversification effect. Risk taking is also well rewarded when holding sovereign bond-backed securities. Overall, the proposal significantly reduces destabilising (potentially self-fulfilling) market dynamics.
Introduction
This paper examines tail risk exposure and hedging properties of estimated yields on sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS) proposed by Brunnermeier et al (2011 Brunnermeier et al ( , 2016 Brunnermeier et al ( , 2017 . The proposed securitisation involves the replacement of a proportion of the supplies of individual European sovereign bonds with senior, mezzanine and junior tranches backed by the purchased sovereigns. The junior and mezzanine components would, in turn, be exposed to agreed levels of losses from defaults on the underlying securities (e.g. 10% and 20% respectively) before senior bond holders would become liable. Simulations by Brunnermeier and others have shown that senior bonds in this securitisation are ex post fundamentally of lower risk than any existing individual sovereign while the mezzanine and junior tranches should experience expected loss rates comparable to those of euro area sovereigns with intermediate and higher credit risks respectively.
However, the existing risk assessments are based on simulated default outcomes -based on a variety of assumed probabilities of defaults, default correlations and expected losses given defaults -rather than on the losses that arise from fluctuations in the market valuation of the securities. This leaves a gap in our understanding of the effects of 'flights-to-safety' and any other type of market panic that could arise from perceptions and doubts about risk exposures of SBBS in very extreme circumstances (and the real feedback effects that these produce). There remains a concern that, when expected losses on mezzanine or junior bonds are at very high levels, the senior SBBS may suffer much larger mark-to-market valuation risks than existing safe assets. Another concern is that there may be insufficient interest in holding the junior bond given that its yield (when compared with single risky sovereigns) may be too low to compensate for its high level of embedded leverage. Lastly, it is of interest to compare the risk attributes of the proposed securities with those of a diversified portfolio of sovereign bonds to assess the ex ante benefits that arise from tranching beyond pure diversification effects. These issues can be addressed if realistic estimates of SBBS yields can be derived.
We implement a pricing tool using historical market data, and a correlated multivariate Monte Carlo approach based on a static copula as described in Schönbucher (2003) , to derive probable yields on the SBBS components of a variety of securitisation structures over roughly a 17-year history. 1 The present analysis uses the estimated yields to ascertain whether the securitisation structure subdues shocks in a way that stabilises markets. They also permit an assessment of whether SBBS are relatively more attractive to investors when compared with individual sovereigns or a weighted pool of euro area sovereigns.
The VAR-for-VaR and MES are ex ante measures of outcomes under extreme market circumstances. The VAR-for-VaR reveals how the likelihood of extreme outcomes in one asset relates to another given some causal ordering (see, Manganelli, 2004 and White, Kim and Manganelli, 2015) . The MES, in contrast, reveals how one asset is expected to fare in terms of expected return when another asset is likely to be experiencing a tail event (we follow the MES procedure outlined in Brownlees and Engle, 2012 where MES contributes to their SRISK measure). MES can therefore capture flight-to-safety dynamics (i.e. a positive outcome when a riskier asset is expected to be experiencing an extremely negative outcome). This can easily be generalised to consider the expected shortfall in one asset based on the probability of a tail event in another single asset (or SBBS). 2 Flights-to-safety will have historically depressed the lowest-risk sovereign yields by more than would be likely if there was a much larger supply of low-risk assets (i.e. if senior SBBS existed and became a substitute for safe heavens). Estimations based on simulations from this history will tend to depress yields too much on the senior SBBS. To address this issue we adjust the Monte Carlo fitting process by imposing a high correlation in the triggering of defaults (all pairwise correlations in the default triggering mechanism are set to +0.6).
The high correlation in the default triggering mechanism increases the incidents in which simulated losses overwhelm the junior tranche (and occasionally the mezzanine too). Under this calibration the estimated senior SBBS yield will be attributed some of the historical premium to compensate for the small amount of simulated losses.
There remain, of course, some limitations on how well the past can be made an adequate representation of a counter-factual institutional arrangement. Brunnermeier et al (2017) model the bank-sovereign diabolic loop, and find that it would be significantly weakened insofar as banks replace their current sovereign bond holdings with senior SBBS. So our 1 This Monte Carlo estimation method is explored in more detail in the report of the ESRB High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets (2018).
2 Other related risk measures that are not as suitable for our purposes include Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) by Acharya et al. (2010) and ∆Co-VaR as proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). analysis, being based on a history without this positive externality, will tend to overstate risks and their spillovers. We extend our analysis to ascertain whether investors are adequately rewarded for the actual and expected risks of their holdings. A commonly used measure is the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966 (Sharpe , 1994 which, in an ex post sense, is the average excess holding period return relative to historical standard deviation of such returns. However, it is also valid to examine expectations of excess returns relative to conditional expected standard deviation of returns. We use GARCH-implied conditional standard deviation and projections of holding period excess returns to derive dynamic Sharpe ratios. In addition to our analysis of the adequacy of holding period excess returns as a return for risk, we also examine yield-to-maturity relative to conditional volatility (and relative to absolute Value-at-Risk) of yield-to-maturity movements. All reward-for-risk measures are compared across SBBS tranches, a euro area GDP-weighted portfolio of sovereign bonds and individual sovereigns.
Our findings imply that the senior SBBS has low levels of tail risk exposure (as low as, and often lower than, the tail risks of the lowest-risk euro area sovereign). Senior bonds also retain similar hedging properties to the lowest-risk sovereign -protecting against exposure to the spillover of losses from tail events in the mezzanine and junior bonds (this remains the case even when there is a two-tier tranching structure). The mezzanine tranche ranks as similarly exposed to tail risk as Italian and Spanish bonds. However, junior assets are very similar in terms of tail risk exposure to Irish and Portuguese bonds and they are less exposed to tail risks than Greek bonds.
The note is arranged as follows. In the next section we briefly outline the data and methodologies employed. In section 3 we discuss the results from application of the VARfor-VaR and MES applications. This is followed by concluding comments.
Data & Methodology

Data
The following senior:mezzanine:junior tranching proportions were used in the VAR-for-VaR and MES analysis; 70:30, 80:20, 90:10, 70:20:10, 80:10:10 . We only discuss a subset of the results (i.e those for 70:20:10 and 70:30 tranching structures). 3 The VAR-for-VaR and MES for the estimated yields is compared with that of individual bonds of 11 euro area countries and with a euro area GDP-weighted portfolio. The results presented apply to assets with 10 years to maturity. Our sample runs from the beginning of January 2003 to the end of October 2016. Daily data for individual sovereign bond yields were sourced from Datastream. Yields for the securities backed by these sovereign bonds were estimated using the methodology discussed below and these were then treated in the same way as other individual sovereign bonds in the VAR-for-VaR and MES analysis. The negative of the daily yield change in basis points is used as the model variable. 4
Estimating SBBS Yields
We estimate the yields of SBBS tranches with a multivariate Monte Carlo simulation that is based on a static copula approach as described e.g. in Schönbucher (2003) . We create a joint distribution function of country-specific random variables to derive scenarios in which the individual country may default. The joint distribution function is created with a Gaussian copula and thereby transformed into country-specific uniform variables between 0 and 1 that are correlated. Depending on the actual historical default probability (PD) of the respective country, a country defaults if the value of its random variable (i.e. one scenario within the simulation run per day and country) exceeds the threshold of (1-PD). For example random values above 0.96 lead to a default for a country with a PD of 4%. In this way, the scenarios define which country bonds in the SBBS structure defaults and allows the calculation of the associated loss. The losses are assigned to the different tranches according to the predefined tranching structure and allows the construction of tranchespecific expected loss (EL) distributions. The overall risk premium (yield exceeding the risk free rate) of the bond portfolio is then allocated to the tranches according to their EL.
Consistency checks ensure that the weighted average yield of the tranches is identical to the yield of the underlying bond portfolio.
The estimation is largely based on historical market data. For the default probabilities and LGD values of the individual countries, we use the bond-implied PD values of the respective day. The implied PD is estimated as the bond yield minus the risk free rate. 5
Datastream benchmark government indices are used for the yield time series of the respective governments. Furthermore, for simplicity we use the lowest country bond yield as the risk-free rate of the respective day. For the country correlation in the default scenario generator, we set a constant value of 60%. This means that the random variables determining default events are noticeably interdependent. 6 30,000 scenarios per day and country have been used for the simulation. For the generation of (uniform) correlated default scenarios, we used the R package MASS. The simulation is based on yield data for 2, 5 and 10 year government bonds of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. Following a weighting scheme based on GDP (average between 2006-2015), those countries cover 97.5% of the volume of the SBBS.
VAR-for-VaR
The VAR-for-VaR methodology of White et al (2015) is essentially a vector autoregression applied to quantile relations in which autoregressive cross-effects are permitted. This extends the Conditional Autoregressive Value at Risk (CAViaR) model of Engle and Manganelli (2004) to a multivariate context. Cross-effects can be between different lagged quantile levels of the same asset but of more interest are the cross-effects arising from quantiles of returns on other assets. In the case of a relation between the lowest-risk asset and higher-risk assets the VaR cross-effects will often be negative (i.e., the lowest-risk asset will have VaR that is becoming less negative while the VaR of the higher-risk assets is becoming more negative).
The VAR-for-VaR approach fits a parameterised smoothed step-function of predetermined variables to choose a quantile value and a categorisation of returns that produces the appropriate number of exceedences of the quantile using an optimisation strategy based on Koenker and Bassett (1978) . For a pair of asset returns, y mt , y at , and associated quantiles, q mt , q at , the period 't' quantiles are related to the most recently estimated quantiles in 't-1' and lagged returns as follows;
Although different quantile levels can be jointly modeled, we estimate the case where a common quantile (e.g. 1%) is chosen for each distribution.
Marginal Expected Shortfall
Marginal Expected Shortfall is the expected return on a specific asset where the expectation takes account of (i) the joint distribution of the standardised returns of the specific asset and a causal asset (e.g. the market) and (ii) the probability of a tail event in the causal asset. The correlation between returns in the joint density of the observations therefore plays a vital role in determining the marginal expected shortfall. For example, when one asset is a safe haven and the other a high-risk asset, it is possible that the marginal expected shortfall of the low-risk asset would be a highly positive outcome when the high-risk asset is experiencing a tail event. In this case, returns on the low-risk asset (conditional on a tail event in the high-risk asset) may exceed average returns on the low-risk asset (so the 'shortfall' terminology can be misleading).
More formally, let the expected value of the standardised market return in the tail be C/σ mt ) where C is set to the market non-parametric 1% VaR. MES is then measured as;
(2)
Following Scaillet(2005) we measure the conditional tail expectations as:
.
where Φ denotes the cumulative normal density and Silverman's "rule of thumb" method is used to determine the bandwidth h (see, Silverman (1986) ).
Practically, the estimation of MES also requires conditional volatility and correlation.
These are estimated using an asymmetric DCC-GJR-GARCH process (see, Glosten et al (1993) ). This specification allows for both a leptokurtic distribution in the returns and common volatility characteristics such as volatility clustering. The asymmetry captures a leverage effect commonly observed in asset markets where negative returns increase volatility more than positive returns. As discussed by Engle (2002 Engle ( , 2009 ) an important feature of this specification is that the autoregressive parameters are restricted so that the expected long-run correlation is equal to unconditional correlation.
Measuring Reward-for-Risk
To ascertain whether investors are adequately rewarded for the expected risks in their hold- In our analysis the monthly holding period return is calculated as follows (where the euribor is the 1 month swap of fixed for floating interbank rate recorded at the beginning of period t);
We calculate the price change using an approximation based on yield changes suggested by Shirvani and Wilbratte (2005) as follows (where D is the duration);
This is also the basis for the conversion of yield volatility to price volatility as follows;
We approximate a high and low coupon based on the fitted relation between yield spreads and coupon spreads (where the yield spread is the spread relative to the bond with the lowest yield and the coupon spread is the spread relative to the risk free return).
Using euro area sovereign bond coupon data from Bloomberg, we find that the approximate relation between the coupon spread and yield spread from January 2012 to end-October 2016 is as follows (standard errors of coefficient estimates are shown below the coefficient
We use a two standard deviation shift of the intercept (in both directions) to derive lower and upper bounds for the coupon assumption for each yield and we restrict the coupon to a maximum of 10.5%. We also round the coupon to the nearest whole percentage and this leads to a variable that mimics more closely what we observe in the individual sovereign historical coupon series. In all related calculations we make sure that the duration is appropriately adjusted for the different levels of the coupons. The fitted coupon rises with yield. This may bias our results towards the finding of a higher Sharpe ratio for the relatively higher-risk sovereigns (and for the higher-risk SBBS). To counter this bias we also consider a case where we imposed a static equal coupon across all the bonds/portfolios/SBBS in our analysis. This reveals a remarkably similar pattern and relative position for the Sharpe ratios.
A dynamic Sharpe ratio can be constructed using a moving average of monthly returns divided by GARCH-implied conditional standard deviation and this is the approach taken here. In addition to the analysis of excess holding period returns we also assess yield-tomaturity relative to conditional volatility of yield-to-maturity movements and relative to
Value-at-Risk. These can be considered as analogous to Sharpe ratios in the sense that we consider a reward relative to a standard risk metric. Yield and price volatility are directly related to each other but, since yield-to-maturity and the holding period return are not necessarily related it is possible that a Sharpe ratio based on yield-to-maturity offers a perspective of interest to longer term investors. We therefore propose a quasi-Sharpe ratio for this measure of reward (i.e. yield-to-maturity relative to standard deviation of changes in yield-to-maturity). This may give different reward-for-risk rankings of the bonds/portfolios/SBBS to those based on the Sharpe for the holding period return because the latter are sensitive to the size of the coupon. Since we also measure risk using conditional VaR (based on extreme yield rises) we are led to employ a third Sharpe-like measure of reward for risk exposure (i.e. simply the yield-to-maturity relative to VaR). This can be thought of as measuring the return that holders-to-maturity obtain for exposure to different levels of default-risk (since default risk and extreme yield rises are likely to be highly correlated).
Results
Comparing Measured Risks
We present the majority of our estimation results in chart form. The mezzanine MES measure, which is conditioned on the probability of the junior tranche having a yield change more negative than its 1% VaR, is often significantly above the mezzanine 1% VaR and this indicates that tail events in the junior SBBS tend to coincide with less extreme movements in the mezzanine tranche (i.e. holders of the mezzanine benefit from a degree of insurance due to initial losses being accepted by junior bond holders). This is a theme that is repeated in the case of the senior tranche discussed below.
Since the junior SBBS generally has a very negative 1%VaR (and this is the most extreme SBBS VaR that we examine) it is immediately of interest to consider how this compares with VaRs of some of the high-risk individual sovereigns. Figure 2 shows the junior tranche has been fully wiped-out). The MES profiles are very similar, but when volatility is at it highest we notice that the German MES marginally exceeds the senior SBBS MES. This is indicative of slightly lower-risks for holders of the lowest-risk sovereign. This is to be expected since German bonds historically benefited from a flight to safety effect that does not apply so readily to the senior SBBS -the latter suffers losses in the most extreme circumstances by definition whereas the German bond does not necessarily become exposed. Still, there are clearly only slight MES differences between the senior SBBS and the lowest-risk sovereign.
It is worthwhile considering how various single sovereign bonds and a diversified portfolio compare with the risk characteristics of the mezzanine and junior SBBS. Figure 4 shows During volatile periods, these low-risk individual sovereign bonds have 1% VaRs that stay relatively stable and, in many cases, the whole distribution of returns on the low-risk sovereign shifts upward. Moreover, the MES of these low-risk sovereigns (i.e. the shortfall conditional on negative outcomes for the mezzanine SBBS below its 1% VaR) tends to rise significantly as the crisis intensifies and decline as it passes. This implies that there is a tendency towards positive returns for these lower-risk single-name sovereign bonds when there are extreme losses on the mezzanine SBBS. This is particularly apparent in the case of the German, Finnish and Dutch government bonds. The country-specific MES comparisons in Figure 5 suggest that shortfall conditional on mezzanine tail events is of a similar magnitude to the country specific VaRs and (unlike for the low-risk sovereigns) this indicates that these higher-risk sovereigns are not benefiting from virtually any safe-haven status. The cases of Italy and Spain are very clear (i.e. MES and VaR are almost exactly the same as each other in these two cases). In the case of the euro area portfolio, despite being quite similar to other low-risk assets in terms of VaR, the diversified portfolio has MES which is close to its own VaR. This implies that the portfolio provides risk reduction through diversification but does not act as a safe haven or hedge against tail risks.
Turning now to the case where there is a two-tier tranche structure (specifically a 70:30 structure). Figure 6 displays The 70:30 case displayed in Figure 6 is not so different from the 70:20:10 situation. This can be verified by noting the small difference between the grey-shaded area and a similar area between the VaR and MES of the 70:30 case. In fact, the 70:30 case also produces similar outcomes to those of the 70:20:10 for all individual sovereigns and the EA portfolio.
The same hedging properties tend to be present in the case of the low-risk sovereigns but absent for the higher-risk cases. The euro area portfolio is once again low-risk in terms of its VaR but also does not possess hedging characteristics. 9
The expected value of the return on each entity conditional on the return for the junior yield change being in the extreme tail depends critically on the correlation between the returns on individual sovereigns with those of the junior SBBS. When the correlation is close to 1 the MES tends to be close to or below the VaR. If the correlation moves into negative territory the asset pairing involves a hedge relationship and in this case the returns will tend to be observed in opposite sides of their respective distributions. Figure 7 shows this relationship between correlation and MES (where the correlation is for the DE and junior SBBS yield changes while the DE MES is conditioned on the junior SBBS yield change being more negative than the junior SBBS 1%VaR).
Return for Risk
The above analysis considers only comparisons of tail risk exposure and the hedging properties of SBBS assets. We now consider reward for risk. We begin by describing the results of a Sharpe ratio analysis for the holding period returns. As mentioned in the methodol- 70:20:10 tranching structure). In each case we allow the coupon to have an upper and lower bound of one standard deviation around the chosen coupon rate based on the standard error of the intercept coefficient in the regression of the coupon spread on yield spread as discussed in the methodology section. This reveals that Sharpe ratios are generally close together. All Sharpe ratios are low and declining during the Great Financial Crisis until 2010. The financial crisis began to affect peripheral sovereigns during 2010. This seems to coincide with an increase in the Sharpe ratios for the mezzanine, senior and German sovereigns (perhaps reflecting safe haven flows). The junior SBBS turns around later and it is plausible that the ECB's non-standard monetary policy measures were responsible for reducing the risks associated with holding the higher-risk sovereigns and therefore the junior SBBS. Sharpe ratios tend to rise towards early-2012 (with the junior SBBS peaking far above the others at a value near 9) and then all but the junior SBBS tend to stay around a value of 4 for the remainder of the sample while the Sharpe ratio of the junior SBBS declines to zero or below for the end of the sample. Figure 9 is the same as the previous figure except that the German Sharpe ratio is replaced by the Sharpe for the euro area portfolio (EA Sharpe). Firstly, the EA Sharpe is very similar to the German case. The EA portfolio gives slightly more reward for risk than the senior and mezzanine SBBS during the crisis periods but otherwise it is very similar to these. Figure 10 shows the SBBS Sharpe ratios against the background of the spread between the lowest and highest individual sovereign Sharpe ratios over time (the purple shaded area). This indicates that the SBBS Sharpe ratios (excluding the junior) are generally contained within the range covered by individual sovereigns. On this basis it appears that the SBBS provide as good (if not better) holding period reward for risk to that of the individual sovereigns.
We now examine the compensation for risk where risk is measured either as GJR-GARCH conditional volatility or as VAR-for-VaR (these are therefore variations of the concept underlying the simple Sharpe ratio). 10 Figure 11 The sample average comparison is shown in Figure 12 .
It is clear from the time-varying Sharpe ratios in the top panel of Figure 11 that the senior SBBS is rewarded in a very similar manner to the German bond. Both seem underrewarded when compared with other low-risk sovereigns but this reflects the fact that they have substantial flight-to-safety price premiums. The black dotted line represents the Sharpe ratio for the senior SBBS in the top panel. This almost always lies directly over the German reading (shown in purple). There is some evidence of a difference between the German and senior SBBS during the pre-crisis period (this was a period when German bonds attracted a slightly higher return for yield -perhaps due to the fiscal situation in Germany driving bond prices down slightly with little change in volatility). Overall however, there is very little difference between the senior SBBS and the German bond in terms of their yield-to-maturity relative to GJR-GARCH volatility. This confirms the ranking of the senior bond in our earlier analysis based purely on risk. The Sharpe ratio on average in Figure 12 confirms the approximate equality between German and senior SBBS. We also see that the mezzanine has a similar reward ratio to that of the French bond. It is notable that the GDP-weighted euro area portfolio frequently has the highest yield relative to volatility. This reflects the strong diversification effects available (with many low and sometimes negative pairwise correlations).
The time varying Sharpe ratios in the bottom panel of Figures 11 and 12 reveal that the junior SBBS is generally not well compensated for its volatility. This under-performance is more prominent in the pre-crisis period. During the crisis and post-crisis period there is regularly a relatively high ranking of the junior SBBS in terms of reward for risk. As mentioned above, there is a possibility that the junior bonds may be subject to receipt of extra coupons relative to what is assumed in the Monte Carlo analysis. On this basis it seems that junior tranches could be made more attractive to investors. While the junior SBBS does not appear to be well compensated it is clear that the mezzanine is very much in line with the relatively high-risk sovereigns such as Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal.
In 
Conclusion
The analysis above examines the ex ante tail-risk characteristics of sovereign bond-backed securities as proposed by Brunnermeier et al (2011 Brunnermeier et al ( , 2016 Brunnermeier et al ( , 2017 . The results of this analysis largely confirm the simulation-based results of Brunnermeier et al using correlated probabilities of defaults and expected loss given default calibrated on historical data. The original simulations found that senior SBBS would be exposed to smaller amounts of risk than even the lowest-risk existing euro area sovereign bond and that junior SBBS would surpass most euro area periphery sovereigns in their pricing. Using Value-at-Risk and Marginal
Expected Shortfall measures we have found that senior SBBS are almost as low-risk as the lowest-risk euro area sovereign (including as a hedge against the extreme risk of many defaults). The mezzanine SBBS is very similar to Spanish and Italian bonds using all risk measures. The junior SBBS under a 70:20:10 tranching structure is not as high-risk as the highest-risk single sovereign but is usually more exposed to market-based losses than sovereigns with intermediate levels of risk exposures. On this basis, the junior bonds may attract investor interest when one considers their likely higher liquidity than existing single high-risk sovereigns.
We found that the senior SBBS has a yield-to-maturity relative to Value-at-Risk that is similar to that of the German bund. The junior bond frequently outperforms in terms of the dynamic Sharpe ratio. In the pre-crisis period and at the end of the sample it under-performs. However, since junior bonds may benefit from higher coupons (as a net benefit from the securitisation), and are likely to be more liquid than comparable individual sovereigns, it should be possible to enhance the junior components of SBBS to make them attractive to investors.
While the VAR-for-VaR approach is flexible, in that it allows for cross-effects, it does not allow for changing parameters in the VAR. Tail risk spillovers may primarily be a feature of crisis circumstances so allowing for parameters to switch in such circumstances may materially affect the findings above. The MES analysis reminds us that the correlation between low-and high-risk assets matters a lot for the perceived (and actual) risk exposure in crisis situations. Some individual sovereigns have very attractive hedging properties (i.e.
high MES) and, while this feature is passed on to the senior SBBS, it may be counteracted by actual exposure to losses in the rare circumstance of a very large number of defaults.
Our simulations have accounted for these circumstances by assuming a very high correlation for defaults in each period. While we have calibrated the yield estimation process to guard against a safe-haven bias we have not tried to represent the benefits that securitisation might bring in terms of reducing risks due the breaking of a bank-sovereign diabolic-loop.
In this respect, our findings are more likely to be an understatement of the benefits of securitisation. senior, mezzanine and junior tranches of the SBBS (these are all for the 10 year maturity and for the 70:20:10 tranching structure). The purple shaded area shows the area between the lower and upper bounds of observed Sharpe ratios across the euro area individual sovereigns. In each case we allow the coupon to have an upper and lower bound of one standard deviation around the chosen rate based on the standard error of the intercept coefficient in the regression of the coupon spread on yield spread as discussed in the methodology section. 
